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Abstract
Background: Recent attempts by large tobacco companies to represent themselves as socially responsible have been
widely dismissed as image management. Existing research supports such claims by pointing to the failings and misleading
nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. However, few studies have focused in depth on what tobacco
companies hoped to achieve through CSR or reflected on the extent to which these ambitions have been realised.
Methods and Findings: Iterative searching relating to CSR strategies was undertaken of internal British American Tobacco
(BAT) documents, released through litigation in the US. Relevant documents (764) were indexed and qualitatively analysed.
In the past decade, BAT has actively developed a wide-ranging CSR programme. Company documents indicate that one of
the key aims of this programme was to help the company secure access to policymakers and, thereby, increase the
company’s chances of influencing policy decisions. Taking the UK as a case study, this paper demonstrates the way in which
CSR can be used to renew and maintain dialogue with policymakers, even in ostensibly unreceptive political contexts. In
practice, the impact of this political use of CSR is likely to be context specific; depending on factors such as policy e´lites’
understanding of the credibility of companies as a reliable source of information.
Conclusions: The findings suggest that tobacco company CSR strategies can enable access to and dialogue with
policymakers and provide opportunities for issue definition. CSR should therefore be seen as a form of corporate political
activity. This underlines the need for broad implementation of Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
Measures are needed to ensure transparency of interactions between all parts of government and the tobacco industry and
for policy makers to be made more aware of what companies hope to achieve through CSR.
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Introduction
On December 3rd 2000, British American Tobacco (BAT) gave
arguably the clearest indication yet of its decision to join the
growing corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement [1] with
the highly symbolic announcement of a £3.8 million donation to
create a Centre for CSR at the University of Nottingham [2,3].
Notice of BAT’s endowment heralded the existence of a broader
strategy that BAT had been working on since the spring of 1997
[4]. Unsurprisingly, news that the world’s second largest publicly
traded tobacco company—selling a product which is currently
estimated to cause 5.4 million deaths a year worldwide [5]—was
attempting to associate itself with the idea of CSR was initially
met with a mixture of cynicism and hostility [6–10]. In the years
following the announcement, however, BAT’s CSR programme
(CSRP) has been steadily accepted and approved by large parts of
the investment and CSR communities. Senior employees are now
frequently invited to speak at public engagements on CSR and
business ethics [11–16] and the company has won numerous
awards for its CSRP (see Box 1) [17].
Whilst the above may represent relatively limited measures
of the extent to which BAT has been accepted as a socially
responsible corporation, the gradual acceptance of the company’s
CSRP is significant given that it has occurred despite widely
available studies pointing to the existence of basic inconsistencies
between many claims in its social reports and how it conducts its
business in practice [18–25]. One reason for this acceptance might
reside in the focus of the existing literature, which, arguably, does
not pay sufficient attention to the essentially political nature
of BAT’s CSRP. Analysis of tobacco companies’ motivation to
develop CSR initiatives tends to focus on its efforts to restore
legitimacy and manage reputation. Where studies do concern
themselves with what we might broadly describe as political
aspects of CSR, such as its use as a tool of regulatory management
[18,21,25], these effects tend to be stated, rather than scrutinised
and explained. As a result, there is currently a lack of depth in our
understanding of what exactly BAT (and, to a lesser extent, other
tobacco companies) hopes to gain from CSR, how its senior
managers believe it might facilitate these ambitions, and how
successful such strategies appear to have been.
This paper aims to build on the existing literature on CSR [26–
28] by exploring how BAT’s CSRP works as a form of corporate
political activity. In keeping with our interest in undertaking a
relatively detailed exploration of the practices and strategies that
CSR makes available to large transnational companies like BAT,
we have taken a case study approach to illustrate the relationship
between CSR, access to political actors, and issue definition.
Specifically our case study concerns BAT’s efforts to reestablish
access with the UK Department of Health (DoH), following the
latter’s decision to restrict contact with major tobacco companies.
Although the focused nature of the case study means that we do not
closely analyse CSR’s other political effects such as constituency
building and agenda setting, the DoH’s decision does allow us to
track the thinking behind, form, and relative success of different
CSR-based techniques. Moreover, despite the geographical focus of
the case study on the UK, the international presence of BAT and its
promotion of CSR across its subsidiaries suggest the existence of
similar practices in other countries in which BAT operates.
We define access as taking place when officials give consider-
ation to the views of policy advocates (in this case BAT) [29]. This
is commonly evidenced by meetings with company representa-
tives. Access to policymakers is often a necessary precondition for
achieving political influence [30–34]; indeed, political scientists
often conceive it as an indicator of political influence [35] and a
crucial component of agenda setting [36]. Issue definition (which is
sometimes used interchangeably with agenda setting [37]) is
typically used to refer to the strategies adopted by social actors (in
this case, large multinational corporations) to define the legitimate
concerns, appropriate reach, and optimal alternatives of public
policy. In the present study, we primarily use the concept to draw
attention to the way in which BAT used its CSRP in dialogue with
policymakers in its efforts to influence the priorities of public and
elected officials in the UK, encourage them to take notice of
alternative modes of (voluntary) regulation being proposed by the
Box 1. Selective summary of awards for BAT’s
social and environmental programmes/
reporting [137].
2009:
N Received a Platinum rating in the UK Business in the
Community Corporate Responsibility Index
N Selected for the 8th successive year as the only tobacco
business in the 2009 Dow Jones Sustainability World
Index (DJSI World) and the Dow Jones STOXX Sustain-
ability Index (DJSI STOXX) for Europe, scored on
economic, social, and environmental performance.
2008:
N Awarded a Gold ranking in the ‘‘Companies that Count
2008’’ list of the UK’s 100 most responsible companies,
published in the Sunday Times and based on the
Business in the Community Corporate Responsibility
Index.
2007:
N Ranked third out of the FTSE100 companies in the
Ethical Bonus Index 2007 (compiled by intelligent Giving
on and focusing on how companies enable staff to
donate to charity, including allowing time off for
volunteering, matching donations, and running a
‘‘payroll giving’’ service).
N Earned an overall score of 98.6% in the Business in the
Environment Index run by Business in the Community
(which placed the company in the highest possible
Platinum performance band).
2006:
N Ranked in the Premier League of Business in the
Community’s Environment Index, as one of the 23
companies out of 155 participants to score over 95%
N Ranked joint 31st of the top 100 companies in Business
in the Community’s wider Corporate Responsibility Index
(including ‘‘outstanding’’ scores for environmental man-
agement and marketplace management)
2004:
N Ranked fourth by the UN Environment Programme
(UNEP) among 50 corporate social reporters (UNEP
found the company’s reporting on human rights and
community development to be ‘‘world class’’ and gave
the Group a score of 64% for its ethical, social, and
environmental performance against an average score of
47%).
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company, and to revise their concerns about whether the industry
could be trusted to work in partnership.
We propose that our case study underlines the value of
understanding BAT’s CSRP as an innovative form of corporate
political activity [38–41]. This approach to conceptualising CSR
has potentially important implications for public health given the
widely documented impact of tobacco companies’ political activity
in delaying and blocking health related policies [42–44]. More
generally, it is likely to be relevant to understanding the impact of
CSR in other industrial sectors, such as alcohol and food, where
CSR also seems to have been used to shape government policy
[45,46].
Methods
The analysis is based on BAT documents made publicly
available as a result of litigation in the US, and which are now
available online at the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library
(http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/index.html). The case study emerged
from a larger programme of work that aimed to explore the
rationale, extent, and impact of BAT’s CSR activities. A snowball
approach was taken to searching the archive between April 2008
and March 2009. Initial searches used broad terms such as social
responsibility, social reporting, and CSR. During this phase of our
documentary searching, the issue of access emerged as an important
potential line of enquiry. Further search terms were then selected to
reflect the names of specific initiatives used to secure access, such as
Partnership for Change, key BAT employees involved in developing
BAT’s CSRP and liaising with policymakers, and public and elected
officials with whom BAT employees attempted to meet. In total 185
search terms have been used to retrieve 9,603 documents (many of
which were duplicates) relating to CSR and social reporting. For the
current study 764 documents, with a date range between 1998 and
2000, have been studied in detail and indexed. Analysis was based
on an approach to company document analysis summarised by
Forster and complemented by archival techniques recommended
by Hill [47,48]. Secondary data were obtained from newspaper
reports and contacts in the field.
Results
Political Background
A brief understanding of the political context to our case study is
crucial to understanding how BAT came to conceive of CSR as
both a mode of securing access and as a way of reshaping the
thinking of policymakers in the UK about how best to respond to
the problem of widespread tobacco use. As a large multinational
company registered in the UK, BAT was, historically, treated as a
political insider by public and elected officials [49,50]. This meant
that it enjoyed privileged access to policymakers and was regularly
consulted on plans for new government policy [51,52]. The
company relied on this close relationship in a number of different
ways. Summarising an agreement by the UK Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) to act as the company’s sponsor, a note
from the company’s External Affairs Manager records that the
department was ‘‘particularly keen to help [BAT] against [its]
foreign competitors’’ [53–55]. Other evidence indicates that the
DTI was open to helping BAT break into new markets [56] and,
until Labour’s 1997 election victory, BAT had often relied on the
UK to work with other member states to veto proposed EU
tobacco control legislation [57,58].
By the late 1990s, however, senior BAT managers had become
concerned that its deteriorating relationship with the DoH was
potentially symptomatic of a broader decline in its status as
a political insider [38]. This feeling was underlined by the
development of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) [59]—an international treaty negotiated under the
auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO)—and a series
of planned tobacco control measures by the European Union
(EU), which included proposals to curb tobacco advertising and
tighten product regulation [57,60,61]. In the UK, these concerns
had been intensified by the Labour Party’s 1997 electoral success.
In contrast to the Conservative Party, whose preference for
voluntary forms of tobacco control [52] reflected its long-term
ideological attachment to limited state intervention in the economy,
Labour was prepared to push through domestic legislation and
support proposals for new regulation in the EU [62]. In January
1998, the Labour Government published a white paper, ‘‘Smoking
Kills,’’ that outlined proposals to abolish tobacco advertising and
promotion, prevent tobacco smuggling, and proposed action on
clean indoor air [63]. The following year the House of Commons
Health Committee undertook a widely reported enquiry into the
tobacco industry [64], and in 2000, the DTI launched a potentially
damaging investigation into BAT’s involvement in cigarette
smuggling (see Box 2) [65–68]. Significantly, both of these were
precipitated in part by the release of internal company documents
[69], which, by deepening distrust of the industry amongst a range
of political actors, was felt to have reduced the company’s access to
officials involved in policy discussions relevant to its business
[70–74].
By 2000, Martin Broughton (BAT’s chair between 1998 and
2004) was describing the relationship between the industry and
the DoH as a ‘‘Mexican stand-off,’’ [75] contrasting it unfavour-
ably with the company’s relationship with previous Conservative
administrations, which had been characterised by close dialogue
with the DoH over both product modification strategies [75] and
the Voluntary Agreement governing tobacco advertising [76] and
health warnings in the UK [77]. More limited access to DoH
officials had a number of important impacts. It left BAT effectively
powerless to challenge the DoH’s refusal to act as the industry’s
advocate in negotiations over the introduction of the EU’s
Tobacco Products Directive (2001/37/EC) [78] and had poten-
tially serious ramifications for its ability to manage the impact of
EU enlargement on its business in Eastern Europe [70].
Relationship building was considered central to managing this
uncertain regulatory environment [79], and it was in this context
that reestablishing access in the UK became a key objective of
BAT’s public affairs strategy.
CSR as a Tool to Reestablish Political Access: BAT and the
UK DoH, a Case Study
CSR as a means of initiating access. BAT’s attempts to
reestablish access with the UK DoH in the late 1990s were
restricted by widespread, low levels of trust in the tobacco industry
[70]. Consequently, senior BAT executives determined that they
first had to explore ways of improving public perception of the
company, as a letter from Broughton to the company’s end
markets in October 1998 explains: ‘‘The group’s image and
reputation as an honest and open organisation have suffered
recently, mainly as a result of the litigation in the US. The new
British American Tobacco plc needs to regain a reputation of
being trustworthy and responsive if we are to …. gain the access
and influence that we need externally. Much of this will come from
being economically successful. However, an important contri-
bution will also come from our reputation as a good corporate
citizen.’’ [80]
Broughton’s remarks reflect a long held assumption of a positive
correlation between corporate reputation and access, which was
CSR and Political Access
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key to realising the company9s policy of encouraging operating
companies to pursue a ‘‘pro-active programme of regular contact
with Government officials, politicians and ministers’’ [81,82].
They are also consistent with evidence that projects were partly
chosen for inclusion in the company’s CSRP based on their
capacity to facilitate access [83,84]. In a corporate responsibility
budget drafted in 1998 by a consultant brought in by BAT to help
develop its CSR strategy, ‘‘identify[ing] and support[ing] projects
that [had] high political priority and that would enhance BAT’s
ability to build ‘platforms for dialogue’ with rule-makers in several
countries’’ was underlined as an important consideration [84].
Moreover, faith in the power of stakeholder dialogue as a means of
‘‘facilitating access to hitherto ‘uncooperative’ opinion-formers’’
was consistently cited as a positive reason for investing in social
reporting [85,86]—a key CSR practice in which companies
publish an audit of their social performance.
Whilst BAT’s early efforts to restore its reputation centred on
building its social reporting capacity [87], this was developed
alongside a number of other communications platforms that, as
one company planning meeting put it, were designed to ‘‘enhance
understanding of [the] Corporate Brand at a deeper level … in an
aligned consistent manner’’ [88]. One of the most important of
these was the company’s Partnership for Change programme
(PCP). This covered a number of key areas such as voluntary
marketing codes, youth smoking initiatives, accommodation of
smokers and nonsmokers, and reduced risk cigarettes (see Box 3)
[89]. Originally devised as a response to criticisms levelled at the
company by the Health Committee inquiry [90], BAT also used
the programme as an organising platform to frame its CSR
initiatives in the early 2000s. By emphasising the value to public
health of meetings between tobacco companies, government
officials, and public health groups in the form of summits and
fora the initiative was well designed to generate dialogue with the
DoH.
In January 2000, Martin Broughton initiated efforts to rees-
tablish contact with the DoH by writing to Alan Milburn, then
Secretary of State for Health. Broughton requested a meeting to
discuss five areas relating to tobacco and disease that the company
had identified as potentially productive areas for working in
partnership with Government and public health groups, which
broadly corresponded to its PCP [91]. Despite BAT’s offer to work
in partnership on these issues, Milburn refused to meet.
Three months later, Broughton followed up a discussion with
the prime minister, Tony Blair, at the Multinational Chairman’s
Group (an informal grouping of the heads of the UK’s biggest
multinational companies who, historically, have enjoyed privileged
access to Downing Street over regular breakfast meetings [67,92]),
with a long and detailed letter outlining the case for lower taxation
[93]. In two lines tagged on to the end of the letter, Broughton
also proposed that the Government consider cooperating with
BAT over developing its PCP [93]. Crucially, whilst the Prime
Minister’s reply rejected all of Broughton’s arguments on taxation,
he suggested that DoH officials would be ‘‘very happy’’ to meet
with Broughton with a view to developing the PCP [94],
underlining the way in which CSR’s seemingly anodyne nature
can help facilitate access.
The Prime Minister’s response was consistent with advice
already proffered by Stephen Byers, then secretary of state at the
DTI, during a meeting with Broughton and BAT’s international
government affairs manager. A note of this meeting indicates that
BAT were hoping to discuss the possibility of the Government
abandoning plans for a UK advertising ban [75]. However, by
describing the ban as a ‘‘manifesto commitment,’’ Byers effectively
scotched this idea. Despite this, the BAT delegation was able to
turn the discussion to another PCP initiative—a forum to develop
the basic principles of responsible marketing for socially harmful
products and services (such as tobacco and gambling). Documents
suggest Byers and his team were prepared to discuss this initiative,
even though it would potentially conflict with the government’s
eventual proposals for an advertising ban. Broughton also used the
meeting to broach the issue of access with the DoH. Byers assured
him that he would speak with Milburn about possible dialogue if
Box 2. DTI investigation into BAT.
In the event, the DTI’s investigation resulted in no further
action being taken against BAT. The circumstances leading
up to the decision was the subject of an investigation by
the Guardian newspaper in 2004 [67]. Evidence of BAT’s
alleged complicity in smuggling had initially been
presented to the House of Commons Health Committee
inquiry whose report specifically called on the DTI to
investigate BAT [64]. Given the serious and complex nature
of the allegations the DTI was reported to be considering
an inquiry under section 432 of the Companies Act 1985
[67], which gives DTI inspectors wide-ranging powers to
seize files, summon witnesses, question them under oath,
and require them to give every assistance in connection
with the investigation. Further, inspectors’ reports under
section 432 are published. This threatened to raise BAT’s
risk to litigation from overseas governments who had lost
revenue and encountered difficulties in enforcing public
health standards as a result of tobacco smuggling.
According to the sequence of events reported by the
Guardian BAT tried to persuade the DTI against a section
432 inquiry. Martin Broughton, the company’s chief
executive, wrote to Stephen Byers (then Secretary of State
for the DTI) twice, asking for an audience, but was rebuffed
on both occasions. However, as a member of the
multinational chairman’s group, a lobbying group com-
posed of leading executives of multinational companies,
Broughton was able to press his case directly to the prime
minister during a private breakfast at Number Ten.
Following the meeting, Byers was summoned to breakfast
with the Prime Minister where he was pressured into
granting Broughton a formal audience. As The Guardian
reported at the time, this was despite the fact that the
‘‘company stood accused of colluding in cigarette
smuggling on an unprecedented scale’’ [67] and despite
the fact that ASH, the antismoking group, had been
refused a similar meeting.
At the meeting, Byers agreed to back BAT in its legal fight
against the Colombian government, which was bringing a
lawsuit in the US over the smuggling allegations. After the
meeting, official documents indicate a distinct change in
tone in the way in which BAT was discussed within the DTI
[67,138]. BAT was talked about as one of Britain’s world-
class companies and Byers’s civil servants pressed him to
cancel the planned inquiry, arguing there was insufficient
evidence. Whilst accepting that the Health Committee’s
intervention necessitated some sort of formal response,
Byers was persuaded to launch the investigation under
section 447 of the Companies Act, which grants inspectors
more limited powers of questioning and which does not
lead to the publication of a report. The inquiry dragged on
for almost 4 years, during which time no further
information was released into the public domain. Byers
moved on and, finally, under the new trade secretary,
Patricia Hewitt, the DTI announced there was insufficient
evidence to take the matter further [67].
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BAT could ‘‘come up with a 4 or 5 point agenda on ‘common
ground for working together’’’ [75]. On first inspection, the DTI’s
intervention might indicate that its officials played a part in
shaping BAT’s CSRP. However, BAT’s response to Byers’
suggestion that the company ‘‘should work with the DTI to pull
an agenda together’’ [75] was largely a restatement of the core
elements of its PCP [95]. This suggests that public officials at the
DTI had very little input into the terms upon which the meeting
with the DoH was set up. In addition to highlighting how
sponsoring departments can help facilitate tobacco companies’
Box 3. BAT Partnership for Change proposals [99,139].
Twenty suggestions for progress
1. Define and ensure responsible marketing
‘‘We believe in our right to provide adult smokers with
brand choice and information, alongside our responsi-
bility to ensure that our marketing does not undermine
efforts to prevent children from smoking. This means, for
example, that:
– Tobacco advertising should not contain imagery or
messages which appeal to children;
– Tobacco marketing should not take place in environments
used mainly by people under age;
– Tobacco advertising should not be misleading.’’
Our proposals:
(a) Establish a forum where the industry, government,
public health groups and consumer advocacy groups
can reach consensus on what constitutes responsible
marketing of tobacco products.
(b) Fund independent research to determine whether any
specific form of marketing has a particular impact on
decisions to smoke by under age teenagers.
(c) In the light of this research, comprehensively review the
voluntary code governing tobacco marketing.
2. Ensure that only adults smoke
Our proposals:
(a) Set up a summit meeting amongst Government, public
health groups, educationalists, tobacco companies, and
retailers, to develop a UK action plan on under age
smoking.
(b) Fund independent research into teenage behaviour,
including decisions to smoke.
(c) Set up a teenage action group, where teenagers
themselves can develop messages to their peers on
how to deal with adult products such as cigarettes and
alcohol, and also on how to deal with illegal drugs.
(d) Mobilise teachers, parents, Government and public
health bodies in an integrated communications cam-
paign with effective messages.
(e) Raise the legal age for tobacco purchase in the UK from
16 to 18, in line with alcohol.
(f) Involve retailers in developing a tighter and more
effective enforcement regime to prevent under age
sales.
(g) Provide more support through schools and retail
outlets for the CitizenCard, a youth identity scheme
that helps retailers confirm a customer’s age.
(h) Research the formal and informal channels through
which under age smokers obtain cigarettes, including
the rapidly growing UK ‘‘black market.’’
(i) Fund independent research into the best excise
strategy to make a major reduction in the UK black
market in tobacco products.
3. Ensure that the public are appropriately informed of
the risks; Ensure that smokers are informed of the
varying levels of risk and are therefore encouraged to
smoke fewer cigarettes, smoke lighter cigarettes, and
quit smoking sooner. We believe that after decades of
public education, people are well aware of the health
risks associated with smoking. However we also believe
there are steps which smokers could take to reduce their
exposure to risk, and that public health messages could
address these. Government, public health bodies and
tobacco companies could work together on such
messages to smokers and innovative ways to deliver
them.
Our proposals:
(a) Fund independent research to determine the extent to
which risk may be reduced from low tar cigarettes.
(b) Discussion amongst tobacco companies, Government,
public health groups and the medical profession to
develop consumer messages on smoking fewer ciga-
rettes, smoking lighter cigarettes, and quitting smoking
sooner.
4. Ensure that the desires of non-smokers to avoid the
annoyance of smoke are accommodated.
Our proposals:
(a) Provide funding to BRE (the Building Research Estab-
lishment) to investigate cost-effective devices for
reducing environmental tobacco smoke in public
spaces.
(b) Support the AIR (Atmosphere Improves Results) cam-
paign in the UK which provides solutions for the
hospitality sector.
5. Ensure that the effort to both research and develop
lower risk cigarettes, and the communication of those
developments to consumers, be encouraged and
supported, unencumbered by opportunistic criticism.
Our proposals:
(a) A scientific forum to discuss which product changes
would be supported by public health groups and might
gain consumer acceptability, and how new products
might be tested.
(b) Fund independent research on very low tar cigarettes,
to determine how much less tar smokers take.
(c) Ask the International Standards Organisation (ISO) to
examine whether current tar and nicotine machine
measurements could be improved.
(d) Consider ways of informing consumers about innova-
tive products, including informational advertising.
CSR and Political Access
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access to other departments, this illustrates the value of a well-
designed set of CSR related messages in setting the agenda of
meetings with public officials (see below).
The combined effect of the DTI’s assistance and the Prime
Ministers’ apparent endorsement of PCP appears to have marked
a turning point in BAT’s efforts to use CSR initiatives to break
down barriers to access. Before receiving the Prime Minister’s
reply Broughton had accepted an invitation to attend a seminar
held annually in the Civil Service National College (now the
National School of Government) in Sunningdale, which brought
together senior civil servants and business leaders [96]. Although a
briefing prepared for this meeting also explored how CSR could
be used as a means of facilitating access to other parts of govern-
ment his primary aim was to make contact with Chris Kelly,
Permanent Secretary to the DoH [96,97]. Following the seminar,
Broughton appealed to Kelly for further dialogue, asking how
BAT might ‘‘engage more constructively with regulators, legisla-
tors, public health authorities and the academic community’’ [98].
To underline that BAT wanted to learn more of the DoH’s major
concerns about tobacco in order to inform its ‘‘thinking about how
[the company] might be able to contribute appropriately to posi-
tive solutions,’’ Broughton supplied Kelly with a copy of BAT’s
PCP [99]; assuring him that this represented ‘‘a genuine attempt
to offer potential starting points for dialogue, especially in areas
where we believe we could ‘‘bring something to the table to
achieve positive results’’ [99]. To keep the dialogue alive, Brough-
ton asked for feedback on these initial ideas, and, significantly,
enclosed a copy of the Prime Minister’s reply to underline that
dialogue with BAT on its PCP had his approval.
Broughton’s efforts were successful in so far as Kelly directed
him to Mohammed Haroon, Branch Head of Cancer Prevention
and Substance Misuse at the DoH [100]. Responsibility for taking
the matter forward within BAT was delegated to Adrian Payne
(BAT’s International Scientific Affairs Manager and future head of
Corporate, Social and Regulatory Affairs) [101]. Summarising his
first meeting with Haroon in a note to BAT executives, Payne
indicated that whilst Haroon had questioned how realistic it was
for the department to accede to his request for dialogue when the
industry was simultaneously suing the Government, he was
prepared to listen to what Payne had to offer. Further, the fact
that Payne also described another DoH official as expressing
considerable interest in what he had to say [102], and the fact that
he noted that both officials ‘‘picked up on the need to obtain
consensus on what might be regarded as ‘safer cigarettes’’’ is
consistent with CSR being effective at developing a constructive
agenda for discussion, which constituted a more enabling milieu
for decisions favouring industry interests (see below) [102].
CSR as an instrument of issue definition and furthering
access. BAT employees also used CSR initiatives and themes as
a means of issue definition to both optimise the probability of
subsequent discussions taking place and frame their content [36].
For example, in Broughton’s letter to Kelly described above,
Broughton opened by assuring Kelly that the ‘‘initial ideas’’ floated
were not ‘‘in any sense intended to be ‘prescriptive’,’’ but rather
represented ‘‘starting points for dialogue.’’ However, he then
immediately directed Kelly’s attention to BAT’s 20 specific PCP
proposals from which he selected several topics (relating, for
example, to youth smoking prevention, ‘‘sensible regulation,’’
potential messages about moderation and research on a ‘‘‘safer’
cigarette’’’), which Broughton was particularly interested in
exploring [99] in future discussions.
That BAT personnel deliberately use CSR initiatives (such as
youth smoking prevention) and CSR messages (such as the
company’s commitment to ‘‘sensible regulation’’ and ‘‘safer
cigarettes’’) to define the issues of meetings with public officials
is also suggested in Adrian Payne’s note of his first meeting with
Mohammed Haroon, which records that, as ‘‘prearranged at my
suggestion, the theme of the meeting was … risk communication
and ‘safer’ cigarettes’’ [102]. The note further indicates that a key
aim of using BAT’s CSRP in this way was to ‘‘establish a dialogue
at a more strategic level than the existing TMA (Tobacco
Manufacturers’ Association) DoH meetings on specific issues such
as additives/ingredients’’ [102]. Although capable of being
interpreted in several ways, these passages are consistent with
BAT attempting to use CSR initiatives strategically to influence
the policy alternatives under discussion within the DoH. The
persistent emphasis on safer cigarettes by BAT officials was com-
mercially significant for the company for several reasons. How-
ever, a key motivation was the creation of common ground
between health ministries and industry scientists. This was
regarded as an important first step in rehabilitating the reputation
of industry funded science, which, in addition to being seen as
crucial to the ability of BAT’s in-house scientists to create new
products, was considered essential to giving the company a cre-
dible voice in policy discussions on how to reduce the risks asso-
ciated with tobacco use [103].
Using CSR narratives and initiatives as a means for suggesting
an agenda for future discussions also provided a platform for
BAT employees to request further dialogue with officials. Payne
reported that he had wound up the meeting by ‘‘restating [the
company’s] desire for dialogue over a range of issues’’ [102]. His
note suggests that, although cautious, Haroon was open to the
idea, responding that ‘‘a step by step approach was the best
option’’ because ‘‘time was needed to build trust’’ [102]. Payne’s
note goes on to explore how he planned to take the matter forward
and suggests that using CSR as a means of continuing dialogue
and, ultimately, normalising relations between the DoH and BAT
was a key objective. In addition to reiterating an earlier suggestion
that the DoH participate in a ‘‘risk reduction forum’’ organised by
BAT, Payne indicated he would ask DoH officials for feedback on
BAT’s Web site; consider suggesting that the Department send an
observer to one of the company’s training sessions on smoking and
health messages; solicit the DoH’s advice on how to get these
messages across ‘‘to those in developing countries that can’t read
or write’’; invite DoH officials to tour the company’s research and
development facilities; and generally encourage discussion of some
of the company’s other CSR proposals [102]. Significantly, the
note also illustrates BAT’s awareness of the need to control the
way in which the concepts involved in its CSRP were defined and
understood by officials, with Payne floating the idea of making a
series of presentations to DoH officials so that they were ‘‘fully
informed and not dependent on third parties’ views’’ [102].
Additional evidence indicates that BAT has continued to use
CSR as a means of issue definition; effectively making old argu-
ments against (nonvoluntary forms of) regulation and governance
in a new form. For example, at a meeting of an All Party
Parliamentary Group on Corporate Responsibility in 2008 [13]
Michael Prideaux (Director of BAT’s Corporate and Regulatory
Affairs department [CORA]), claimed that, by focusing on
reducing smoking rates, the FCTC had effectively rejected harm
reduction ‘‘as a part of a pragmatic approach to public health’’
[13]. In this way, CSR was used to reframe BAT’s long running
efforts to reduce the impact of the treaty on tobacco sales as a
constructive and responsible response to the health problems
associated with tobacco consumption [104].
Although, as in the above examples, the inherent capacity of
CSR to define issues for discussion typically facilitates dialogue
around specific CSR initiatives and concerns, it may also have
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long term effects on the relationship between government and the
tobacco industry that expedite influence. To this effect, there is
some evidence to suggest that CSR-based access is designed to
shift relations from low trust, low frequency access to high trust,
high frequency access—something that is broadly recognised as
being key to political influence across policy domains [105–108].
As Payne put it after his first meeting with Haroon: ‘‘If we can get
a dialogue going it would be a good opportunity for [Martin
Broughton] to get together with Alan Milburn to take an umbrella
view of the interaction (how could we progress faster?). If we can’t
get one going they could meet to focus on why not (i.e., what
would we have to do to build trust?). As with many of our
stakeholder interactions, trust-building is paramount.’’ [102].
CSR and the Proliferation of Access Points
The documents also illustrate the way in which CSR has
expanded the number of access points across Government, pro-
viding BAT with more opportunities to meet and talk to officials.
This is perhaps best exemplified by a note from BAT’s Inter-
national Development Affairs Manager outlining civil service
contacts with a CSR brief in British Government Departments in
preparation for Broughton’s Sunningdale meeting. The document
records four government departments (the Department for
International Development, the DTI, the Department for the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) either with units devoted to, or with
strategic interests, in CSR, in addition to the Performance and
Innovation Unit in the Cabinet Office which, at the time, oversaw
the CSR agenda [97].
BAT’s use of these additional access points to change attitudes
within government more broadly is illustrated by a written
exchange between Michael Meacher, then the Minister for the
Environment, and Broughton. Meacher had written to Broughton
as part of the Government’s strategy on sustainable development
in the UK, asking him for a summary of the action BAT was
taking to measure, manage, and report on its environmental
impact. Meacher noted that he had particular cause to write to
Broughton, given that BAT had scored poorly in a recent survey
by Pensions Investment Research Consultants’ (PIRC, Environ-
mental Reporting 2000). The significant point to note about the
letter is that it focused exclusively on the environment, Meacher
requesting detailed responses from Broughton to a range of
questions (see Box 4) [109]. Despite this, Broughton’s lengthy reply
opened by discussing the company’s PCP proposals, which he
claimed exemplified the company’s policy of ‘‘actively seek[ing]
constructive dialogue on many issues relevant to [the] industry, in
the spirit of commitment to corporate social responsibility.’’ Ack-
nowledging that this was not immediately specific to Meacher’s
questions, Broughton nonetheless invited Meacher to ‘‘discuss any
of these matters … within the context of the broad social di-
mension of sustainable development, and would welcome an
opportunity to hear [Meacher’s] views.’’ [110]. In the event,
Meacher’s reply ignored Broughton’s invitation [111]. Nonethe-
less, the exchange highlights how the fuzzy boundaries and
negotiation at the core of CSR can allow companies to exploit
alternative channels to getting key strategic messages across to
officials.
Discussion
Before discussing the policy implications of our findings, it is
important to note that our account gives an incomplete picture. As
we explain below, the ability of CSR to facilitate access and create
opportunities for issue definition is likely to be context dependant
[112]. Our efforts to interview the policymakers mentioned in
BAT’s documents were unsuccessful, making it difficult for us to
fully explore this context and its effects on what officials may have
thought about BAT’s proposals. Nevertheless, the data suggest that
CSR facilitates access and creates opportunities for issue definition
in a number of ways.
First, CSR facilitates access by providing a basis for requesting
meetings with officials who are reluctant to talk to the industry—
something illustrated by the fact that whilst attempts to discuss
other issues (e.g., tax) were dismissed outright, officials were still
willing to discuss BAT’s PCP. In relation to the DoH, CSR
appears to have worked to this effect by: (a) allowing the company
to open up a dialogue about the importance of cooperation and
consensus; (b) conveying a sense that the company was offering,
or was prepared to offer, some support for government efforts
to reduce tobacco consumption; and (c) adding a vital moral
dimension to the company’s argument that some level of coopera-
tion between the company and government was desirable by
presenting the company’s proposals as genuine and in the interests
of public welfare. Indeed, one of the key factors behind the ability
of CSR to open channels of communication may relate to its use
of accessible images and emotive appeals to widely accepted
social and political values [113–116]. By linking the company’s
preferred policies to politically salient values such as harm
reduction, child health, and the importance of cooperation be-
tween business and government, BAT’s employees were able to
represent dialogue as both the morally right thing to do and
benign and, therefore, as unlikely to compromise government
policy on tobacco control.
In terms of issue definition, our case study illustrates how BAT
then harnessed the initiatives and narratives associated with its
emerging CSRP to shape the agendas of meetings, in effect
defining key issues once access had been established. Using CSR
as a means of defining salient issues [117] allowed the company to
reopen dialogue over specific issues that appeared closed for
discussion and to shift the focus of talks onto voluntary alterna-
tives to statutory measures or other topics (e.g., reduced harm
Box 4. Meacher’s initial questions to
Broughton [109].
N Does your company have an environmental policy and, if
so, what is it, is it made public and where?
N Is there a board member with specific responsibility for
environmental issues?
N What information does your company publish about
environmental performance including compliance with
relevant laws and regulations?
N Specifically, does your company measure its impact on
the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions
from energy user, waste emissions, and water use. Is this
information made public and how?
N Does your company set quantified targets for improve-
ment in these or other environmental impacts and, if so,
what are they, are they made public and how?
N What other environmental initiatives does your company
carry out or support?
If you cannot yet respond positively to all or some of these
questions, but your company is already planning to take
action in these areas, I would be grateful if you could also
make this clear.
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cigarettes), which were consistent with the company’s immediate
and long-term commercial interests.
In this respect, BAT’s engagement with the DoH illustrates the
way in which CSR offers companies with poor social or
environmental records a structured environment of dialogue and
engagement, which shifts attention away from both the social costs
associated with the business and any past behaviour that might
cause doubts about the trustworthiness of the company and the
relative merits of granting it access. Furthermore, by creating new
access points for such companies, it helps normalise engagement
and dialogue—a crucial step in this context to restoring the trust
necessary for the tobacco industry to reestablish its political
authority [107,118–120]. These risks are magnified by the fact
that new access points created around CSR largely exist outside of
departments and agencies with experience of dealing with the
tobacco industry, which means contact is often with public officials
who have little knowledge of the company’s core business and past
conduct. An important point to understand in this context is
tobacco firms’ ability to absorb the costs associated with political
activity. This means that the depth of industry–government
contact is primarily determined by officials’ attitudes to and beliefs
in the value of meeting with representatives of the industry. By
increasing industry contact with government, CSR effectively
alters the balance of officials’ diet of information about tobacco
and the tobacco industry in favour of tobacco companies.
There is evidence that our case study of the UK is not an
isolated example. A recent report by Corporate Observatory
Europe suggests that BAT has also used CSR practices, such as
stakeholder dialogue, to transmit policy positions to EU policy
makers [121]. Likewise a 2007 presentation by Ben Stevens, now
BAT’s Finance Director, indicates that a key aim of stakeholder
dialogue is to develop cooperative relationships with policymakers,
which represent a more effective platform for influencing tobacco
regulation [122].
Despite the importance that corporate actors attach to access, it
is no guarantee of either issue definition or policy influence. Since
1997, UK government policy on tobacco control has largely been
at variance with industry interests [62]. This is consistent with
evidence from the documents which suggests that some DoH
officials tried to actively manage BAT’s expectations of in person
meetings by emphasising that agreements to meet and listen to
what the company had to say did not mean that either government
policy or policy implementation were open to negotiation [102]. In
short, whilst CSR may represent an effective medium of issue
definition under the right conditions (see below), documents
indicate that this is more difficult for corporations where officials
are well informed and following a clear, evidence-based public
policy agenda formulated independently of economic interests.
DoH replies to BAT letters on the draft EU directive reinforce this
interpretation of the documents [123]. Despite BAT’s failure to
translate access into policy outcomes, and despite the fact that the
documents only give company officials’ explanations of the course
of events, it is nonetheless important to stress that CSR was still
used successfully by BAT to secure and extend access within an
unreceptive policy environment, where public health advocates
have been active in highlighting the risks attendant on industry
political activity. It is reasonable to hypothesise that the impact of
political CSR is likely to be greater under different political
administrations or in countries where policy e´lites have historically
been more accommodating of industry interests and where the
health and economic impacts of specific policy alternatives
favoured by the industry is not as widely understood.
This observation raises a more general point about the impact
of economic and institutional factors on the relative effectiveness of
political CSR. Broughton’s membership of high-level policy
groups (the Multinational Chairman’s Group) and e´lite social
networks (Sunningdale)—both of which were important to
reopening dialogue with the DoH—indicate that officials’ per-
ceptions of tobacco and, for that matter, other companies as an
important source of capital investment, employment, foreign
revenue, and taxation receipts [124,125] are likely to be a key
factor in determining the effectiveness of political CSR. In our case
study, these ‘‘access drivers’’ were offset by DoH officials’ reluc-
tance to negotiate with BAT on alternatives to policy implemen-
tation; suggesting that trust amongst policy e´lites in companies’
ability to provide reliable information is likely to be a key
determinant of the impact of political CSR.
This last point may help to explain why companies from other
industrial sectors—specifically food and alcohol—are currently
enjoying greater success in influencing public health policy in the
UK through the government’s Public Health Responsibility
Deal [126]. The Deal encompasses five cross-sectoral networks
established to drive improvements in public health. As presently
constituted, corporations and business organisations outnumber
nonbusiness organisations and individuals (academics, nongovern-
mental organisations, representatives of public institutions) two to
one in the food and alcohol networks that are responsible
for setting immediate public health objectives in these areas
[127,128]. By devolving policy formation and delivery to
companies whose products and marketing practices constitute
the key proximate drivers of alcohol- and diet-related ill health and
mortality this marks a potentially important shift in public health
policy towards coregulation [129–133]. The organising principles
of the Deal draw heavily on the idea that CSR can be exploited to
promote public health. Further, devised when the Conservative
Party were in opposition, newspaper reports indicate that the
existence of the Deal owes much to the success that large food
and drink companies have had in using CSR as a means of
both gaining access to senior Conservative Party members and
developing an alternative agenda for public health policy, which
attempts to reconcile public health with business competitiveness
[129]. Our findings—and the absence of strong evidence
suggesting that coregulation is capable of aligning the business
models of big food and drinks companies with the demands of
public health [126]—suggest that the role of CSR in the Deal
needs to be subjected to closer scrutiny.
Finally, in highlighting the political dimensions of CSR, this
paper underlines the importance of parties to the FCTC acting on
the Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 [134]. Article 5.3
was specifically introduced to protect health policies from tobacco
industry influence [135]. Its impact depends on governments
Box 5. Recommendation 6.1 and Guiding
Principles 2 and 3 of Article 5.3 of the FCTC
[134].
Recommendation 6.1: Parties should ensure that all
branches of government and the public are informed
and made aware of the true purpose and scope of
activities described as socially responsible performed by
the tobacco industry.
Guiding Principle 2: Parties, when dealing with the tobacco
industry or those working to further its interests, should be
accountable and transparent.
Guiding Principle 3: Parties should require the tobacco
industry and those working to further its interests to
operate and act in a manner that is accountable and
transparent.
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implementing the Guidelines that comprise a number of Guiding
Principles and Recommendations [135]. Recommendations 6.1
and Guiding Principles 2 and 3 are particularly relevant to our
findings (see Box 5) [134,136]. Recommendation 6.1, one of four
recommendations that relate to political CSR, states that parties
should ensure that all branches of government and the public are
informed and made aware of the true purpose and scope of
activities described as socially responsible performed by the
tobacco industry. Guiding Principles 2 and 3 emphasise the
importance of interactions between the tobacco industry and
government being transparent (principle 2) and that parties to the
Convention require the tobacco industry to provide government
officials with information that facilitates the effective monitoring of
tobacco industry political activity (principle 3). Although the events
described in this paper predate the FCTC, they highlight the
importance of ensuring that public officials in nonhealth govern-
ment departments (such as the DTI, now the Department of
Business, Innovation and Skills) are appropriately briefed on the
underlying political motivations of tobacco industry CSR and
given advice on how to respond to the industry in light of the
general intent of Article 5.3. Second, they underline the
importance of all meetings with representatives from the tobacco
industry being formally minuted and made publicly available
either through government Web sites or through freedom of
information legislation. This is presently not the case in the UK in
relation to meetings of the Multinational Chairman’s Group,
which was the subject of a recent ruling by the UK Information
Commissioner. The Commissioner ruled that minutes and
correspondence of the meetings are not disclosable under the
Freedom of Information Act on the basis that they relate to the
formulation and development of government policy and are,
therefore, exempt under section 35(1)(a) of the Act. In light of the
findings of this paper, this decision needs to be revised in relation
to tobacco companies to bring it into line with the Guidelines for
Implementation of Article 5.3.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. In the past, companies and multinational
corporations were judged on the profits they made.
Nowadays, though, much is made of corporate social
responsibility (CSR). CSR is the commitment by business to
behave ethically and to contribute to economic
development while improving the quality of life of the
workforce, their families, the local community, and society
at large. Put simply, companies and corporations now
endeavor to show that they have a positive impact on the
environment, consumers, employees, and society in
addition to making money for their shareholders. Large
tobacco companies are no exception. British American
Tobacco (BAT, the world’s second largest publicly traded
tobacco company), for example, began working on a wide-
ranging CSR program more than a decade ago. Given that
tobacco is responsible for an estimated 5.4 million deaths
worldwide annually, this program was initially met with
hostility and dismissed as an image management exercise.
However, large parts of the investment and CSR
communities now approve of BAT’s CSR program, which
has won numerous awards.
Why Was This Study Done? But what do BAT and other
tobacco companies actually hope to achieve through their
CSR initiatives and how successful have they been in
achieving these aims? Few studies have addressed these
important questions. In particular, there has been little
research into the extent to which tobacco companies use
CSR initiatives as a form of corporate political activity that
can help them gain ‘‘access’’ to policymakers and define
the legitimate concerns and optimal alternatives of public
policy (‘‘issue definition’’). Access is defined as taking place
when policymakers consider the views of policy advocates
such as tobacco company employees and is a crucial
component of issue definition, which refers to the
strategies adopted by bodies such as multinational
corporations to influence the policy agenda by defining
what issues public policy should concern itself with and
how it should approach them. In this case study, the
researchers explore whether BAT’s CSR program works as a
form of corporate political activity by systematically
examining internal BAT documents made publicly
available as a result of US litigation. Specifically, the
researchers examine BAT’s efforts through its CSR program
to reestablish access with the UK Department of Health
following the department’s decision in the late 1990s to
restrict contact with major tobacco companies.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? Using
iterative searching, the researchers identified 764 docu-
ments in the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (a large
collection of internal tobacco company documents released
as a result of US litigation cases) that contain information
relevant to BAT’s CSR strategies. Their analysis of these
documents indicates that one of the key aims of the CSR
program actively developed over the past decade by BAT
was to help secure access to policymakers and shows how
BAT used CSR to renew and maintain dialogue with
policymakers at a time when contact between govern-
ment and tobacco companies was extremely restricted. The
documents also show that BAT employees used CSR
initiatives as a means of issue definition to both optimize
the probability of subsequent discussions taking place and
to frame their content. Finally, the documents illustrate how
BAT used its CSR program to expand the number of access
points across government, thereby providing BAT with
more opportunities to meet and talk to officials.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings
suggest that CSR is a form of corporate political activity
that potentially has important implications for public
health given the documented impact of the political
activity of tobacco companies in delaying and blocking
health-related tobacco control policies. In practice, the
impact of the political use of CSR is likely to be context
specific and will depend on factors such as whether senior
policymakers regard companies as reliable sources of
information. Importantly, these findings underline the
need for broad implementation of Article 5.3 of the
World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC), an international treaty that calls
for the introduction of multiple measures to reduce
tobacco consumption, including tobacco advertizing
bans and relevant taxation policies. Article 5.3 aims to
protect public-health policies on tobacco control from
tobacco industry influence. The findings of this study
indicate that implementation of Article 5.3 will require
measures that ensure transparency in interactions
between all parts of government and the tobacco
industry and will need an increased awareness across
government of what tobacco companies hope to achieve
through CSR.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites
via the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1371/journal.pmed.1001076.
N The Corporate Responsibility (CORE) coalition, an alliance
of voluntary organizations, trade unions, and companies,
maintains a Web site that contains useful material on
corporate social responsibility
N The European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ)
promotes corporate accountability by bringing together
national platforms of civil society organizations (includ-
ing NGOs, trade unions, consumer advocacy groups, and
academic institutions) from all over Europe
N The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library is a public,
searchable database of tobacco company internal
documents detailing their advertising, manufacturing,
marketing, sales, and scientific activities
N The World Health Organization provides information
about the dangers of tobacco (in several languages),
details of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (in several languages), and guidelines for the
implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC
N The Framework Convention Alliance provides more
information about the FCTC
N For information about tobacco industry influence on
policy, see the 2009 World Health Organization report
‘‘Tobacco interference with tobacco control’’
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